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Dear Duncan, Thank you for your detailed summary last Friday, and in particular for giving such full play to the discussion on commodities. I would just like to make a couple of further points, if I may. First of all, I wish to reply to your query about hedging and price insurance. Hedging is routinely carried out by large buyers and sellers of those commodities in which futures trading exists, in order to lay off the risk of adverse price swings that is inherent in such markets. It is a normal commercial practice and part of everyday trading in such commodities. However, the point of commodity agreements or other public forms of supply management is rather different: to smooth out the fluctuations in market prices, rather than insure against them. As such, it operates in a different arena. When undertaken by public authorities (as opposed to commercial cartels), it is something akin to countercyclical fiscal policy or intervention by central banks in foreign exchange markets. Maybe someone out there with more direct experience of futures markets will put me right on this, but I find it hard to see what role any hedging instrument can play in that. Secondly, I think I ought to add a health warning to my earlier comments. Though probably not necessary for the participants in this consultation, it needs to be made just the same. I drew some examples from the behaviour of commercial cartels, some of which might be viewed by many readers with a degree of distaste. I wish to make it clear that I see no moral equivalence between the types of supply management we have discussed and price manipulations made by commercial firms to exploit their own market strength. They might use some of the same methods, but there is a big difference in the objects of the policy and the way it is gone about. Where markets act to the disservice of poor and vulnerable people, I think it is right to intervene and correct that, wherever possible. It must be done in a fully transparent and accountable way, as a result of public policy decisions, openly arrived at. That is not at all the same as private cartels operating to maximise their own commercial gains. Tom Lines ----- Original Message ----- From: Duncan Green To: <address removed> Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 5:08 PM Subject: Agriculture and trade theme, fourth summary from themoderator, 20th May Agriculture and trade theme, fourth summary from the moderator, 20th May Commodities and Supply Management Finally, he points out that any SM agreement will at some point face severe strain, and has to be designed from the outset with that in mind. One thought that occurred to me on this - is this somewhere where hedging or other forms of risk management might indeed play a useful role? International agreements could provide the scale and security required to make them effective customers for market-based risk management instruments such as hedging. Tom goes onto discuss some other commodity issues. On short-term price volatility, he has little time for the World Bank's work on market based risk management, seeing it as little more than a business generation exercise by traders and financial providers, of little relevance to small farmers. He also believes that they offer little solution to the medium term (2-3 year) price swings which play havoc with governments.
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