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As a late entry let me congratulate DFID for supporting a vigorous and
important discussion. I look forward to the summaries and am wondering
if there may be future ways to engage each other as people gain new
information and insights.
I am with USAID in the office of Natural Resources Management and would
like to take this late opportunity to join the Producer Group
discussion. Being on travel over much of the debate and only now being
able to focus on the discussion, my knowledge of the full range of the
contributions on producer groups is spotty. While I risk rehashing what
others have said, I would like to add a few observations picked up from
taking stock of numerous agricultural/natural resources management
(ANRM) initiatives across Africa over the last twenty years or so.
In a nutshell, I have found effective producer groups to be key to many
of the successful ANRM that I observed and assessed. However, I quickly
admit that I have also seen other producer groups that were poor
servants to their members. Characteristics distinguishing the effective
ones included the following: they were democratic and representative;
the leadership was accountable to the membership; they were run
according to sound business principles; they were legally recognized,
they set their own priorities, and, the books were open for all of the
membership to see and transactions were made transparently.
In the ANRM sector many of the producer groups that I know about came to
life during the 1980s and 1990s at a time when a number of African
countries started devolving and sharing authority with rural populations
over the management and exploitation of local resources (forestry,
hunting, fishing, etc.) For example producer groups in Mali, Senegal,
and Guinea negotiated agreements with the State over forest management
rights and responsibilities. In Botswana and Namibia, communities
organized themselves as the State devolved authority to rural
populations over wildlife areas and provided for Joint Venture
agreements to be made between legally-recognized groups and the private
sector. (Looking at the transfer of authority in hindsight, it was the
interest of most parties that the State hand off or share authority with
some entity that could stick to and enforce the terms of a negotiated
agreement. In a number of cases, well organized and disciplined
producer groups served as such an entity.)
A number of "experiments" grew out of these new policies and rules, some
with unexpected outcomes. Improved livelihoods were certainly the major
driving force behind the development of producer groups, but some
organized themselves for more long-term goals. For example, a number
worked to put a stop to degradation practices that they saw as damaging
to their well being over the long term. A shift in the community power
structure was a frequent outcome. It was common, for example, to see
formerly-disenfranchized groups--e.g., women and youth--gain leadership
positions as their financial management and organizational skills became
more valuable to the group's enterprises. As another outcome that came
as a shock to some was the change from the rule of the privileged to the
rule of law. For example, legally-recognized producer groups in both
Senegal and Guinea used their status to successfully sanction privileged
people who tried to violate forest management plans developed by the
group. (These examples underscore how AGRN initiatives served as
effective vehicles for strengthening democratic and good governance
principles.) Finally, in some cases producer groups confederated to
gain more leverage over key business functions. In Mali, about a dozen
producer groups formed their own fertilizer import firm to compete with
the parastatals in providing members with timely delivery of
high-quality fertilizers.
Negotiated agreements were a characteristic common to many effective
producer groups. Producer groups have been able to improve the well
being of their members by negotiating rights and access to land,
commodity prices, and commercial loans. However, some of the most
intensive negotiations in the above examples were not necessarily
between the CBO and outside interest. Rather, they were within the CBO
itself as various interest groups negotiated over how new rules would
shift income from one group (e.g., women) to another and how losses to
various groups would be compensated. For many of these communities
where many rules had previously been imposed by the State or by the
traditional village power structure, the negotiating processes were
vehicles for true empowerment.
Obviously, I am an advocate of effective producer groups but agree with
many they do not happen automatically. The effective ones discussed
above were the products of investments in intensified training and
support. Functional literacy training for key members of the group--if
not most members--was key to the success of the group. In several
cases, functional literacy training used materials directly pertaining
to the producer group's core business. Democratic principles and basic
business training were also key elements. And, training often took a
step-wise approach to establishing priorities for the group. (A measure
of progress for many groups was that their priorities shifted as the
development of the group and enterprises broadened their perspectives.)
Finally, we are seeing an increasing number of policies and laws that
transfer authority. While a necessary step, it is passive if there is
not some local entity to appropriate the rights and responsibilities
transferred. When the latter happened, we saw a true transfer of power,
not just authority.
A question that often comes up is whether countries and donors can
afford the cost of supporting the development of effective producer
groups? My initial response would be that we can not afford not to,
particularly if we take stock of the TOTAL value of what they do now and
what we can expect them to do as they assume many responsibilities that
the State (and donors) now pay for. My sense is that the initial
generation of truly democratic, business-based producer groups were
indeed expensive to establish. But, not only were we then paying for
the proof-of-concept stage, we now have a greater body of knowledge
about how to go about it. And, in some cases, I have seen where
producer groups have started to invest in their own development (e.g.,
paying for adult literacy for training) or are making money from
services rendered. Looking at private sector, fee-for-service
approaches should not be off the table. In any case, I, for one, would
much appreciate being able to pull together our collective knowledge on
the development and impacts of effective producer groups.
--
Mike McGahuey
NRM advisor
EGAT/NRM/LRMT
202-219-0449
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