New Directions for Agriculture in Reducing Poverty

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Overall Summary by John Farrington



RISK AND VULNERABILITY 
How can DFID help to tackle risk and vulnerability factors 
that prevent poor people from engaging and investing in 
agriculture?
Moderator?s final summary ? 1 June 2004.
1. Definitions
Risk is the likelihood of occurrence of a particular and 
potentially adverse shock or stress (such as a drought or 
flood). Risk prevention or mitigation would therefore be 
done at the broad level of, for instance, breeding drought-
resistant crops, or setting up large-scale irrigation 
systems.

Vulnerability is the degree of exposure of individual 
households or individuals to shocks and stresses, and 
their ability to prevent, mitigate or cope with the event. 
Vulnerability reduction would therefore be done at the 
level of one or a group of households ? by increasing their 
asset base, increasing their ability to access irrigation or 
new varieties, and so on. But some shocks and stresses 
may be related to status in some way, such as the 
particular vulnerabilities faced by adolescent girls, the 
elderly, minorities, HIV/AIDS sufferers, and so on ? in 
which case the appropriate response is likely to be in 
higher-level policies directed towards these groups. 
2. Understanding better who the vulnerable are
Several discussants stressed the contribution that 
participatory vulnerability assessments can make to 
understanding which communities, sub-groups, 
households or individuals are vulnerable, why, and what 
can be done about it. Some saw a rights-based approach 
as an essential weapon in the struggle to ensure that the 
poor not only have access to resources, but also the 
power to use them to meet their requirements. At a 
different level, the right of women to equal treatment was 
also emphasized. Several saw these three dimensions: 
participatory assessment, prevention of elite takeover, 
and promotion of rights and gender equality as principal 
platforms for action by donors such as DFID. Others saw 
the need for donors to support better (i.e. more scientific) 
assessments of the risk attributable to e.g. natural events 
such as drought, flooding and so on. Underpinning much 
of the discussion was a view that power relations worked 
against the poor, and that their capacity to identify their 
own requirements, address them where possible from 
their own resources, and make demands on government 
where appropriate would have to be strengthened (see 
below). 
3. Mainstreaming risk and vulnerability concerns into policy 
and planning
The background document for this discussion group 
argued that a primary requirement was for governments to 
incorporate risk and vulnerability-reducing measures into 
their planning. The argument was given, for instance, that 
the imperatives to increase farm revenues (usually based 
on increased yields) tended to dominate agricultural 
policy, losing sight of the need to reduce the variance of 
revenue. Reduced variance might be associated with, for 
instance, slightly less intensive production strategies (so 
that some yield is traded off against stability ? a notion 
which, at least implicitly, seems to have caught the 
attention of several contributors to the forum), and/or with 
such traditional practices as mixed cropping, 
intercropping, relay cropping, mixed crop/livestock/tree 
systems, and so on. 
At a higher level, the background paper argued that even 
policy at higher levels than the agriculture sector could, if 
managed properly, be risk-reducing. Thus, policies in 
favour of one or other rate of interest, or foreign exchange 
rate, could be more or less risk-reducing for low-income 
farmers, depending on local circumstances.
One powerful argument raised in the e-discussion is that 
these arguments should be extended to an even higher 
level ? namely that relating to international trade. 
Internationally marketed commodities face long-term 
international decline ? but also medium-term price swings 
(as, for instance, Ethiopia experienced with coffee, its 
most important export, the revenue from which fell from 
$420M in 1998 to $175M in 2001, almost entirely as a 
result of price swings). Two possibilities were aired to 
deal with this situation: one was compensatory finance 
mechanisms, the other being agreements among 
producers to restrict supply. In each case, more nuanced 
approaches in both these possibilities would be needed 
than in the past. A third possibility ? of reviving buffer 
stock mechanisms ? would also help to deal with very 
short term supply fluctuations. Little prospect of success 
was held out for the types of ?hedging? operations being 
tested by the World Bank. One (albeit perhaps cynical) 
view of these was that they were likely to do little more 
than generate work for stockbrokers. Several contributors 
argued that pressures emanating from Economic Reform 
Programmes towards greater reliance on trade 
exacerbated the impact of these price fluctuations (and no-
one dissented from this view). One related question was 
how some of the advantages of now defunct parastatals 
could be re-captured without reintroducing also the 
negative factors associated with them. One suggestion 
here was that commercial banks might be able to take on 
some of the role of parastatals providing that other risk-
reducing measures could be pursued, such as the 
granting of title to land so that it could be offered as 
collateral against loans or bank guarantees.
One view echoed in several of the contributions was that 
there is much that can be done within productive sector 
policies and procedures to reduce risk and vulnerability. 
By the same token, there is much that can be done within 
social sector policies (focusing on the reduction of  risk 
and vulnerability) which in turn can promote production. 
4. Strengthening people?s asset base
The vulnerability levels of individuals or households 
depend heavily on the type and volume of assets they 
own (or can access). The Sustainable Livelihoods 
framework sets out broad categories of assets, but much 
needs to be learned about the most appropriate types and 
management practices for assets particularly relevant to 
the poor because of the can be liquidated in ?bite? sizes 
(such as chickens) to meet expenditure needs as they 
arise. Also, some assets (such as on-farm trees) might 
appear vulnerability-reducing, but regulations governing 
e.g. felling, may need to be reformed before these realize 
their full potential. Some discussants mentioned individual 
title to land in this context, and one contribution highlighted 
how corporate land title permitted borrowing which revived 
some of the tea industry in Bangladesh, but few ventured 
into the newer arenas relating to land, such as the 
opportunities for improving leasehold markets, and for 
making inheritance arrangements more gender balanced. 
5. Transfers, insurances etc
There was broad agreement that more needed to be 
done in relation to these. One correspondent was 
optimistic about engaging the private sector to deliver 
insurances of various kinds (possibly subsidized, in the 
first instance). Discussions on transfers largely focused 
on food entitlements. In some ways, this was the least 
complete part of the discussion: to mainstream risk and 
uncertainty in policy processes is essential, but only part 
of the necessary response. Transfers can be made in 
cash or kind, and either against local contributions (e.g. via 
food for work) or without any counterpart contribution. 
These modalities have strengths and weaknesses which 
need to be matched to local circumstances. There are 
also trade-offs within broad types of transfer. Thus, the 
simpler the decision-rule over who is entitled to what, the 
stronger the prospects for developing elements of 
citizenship (capacity to make demands and insist on 
accountability of providers), but the greater the potential 
wastage in terms of errors of inclusion or exclusion. Also, 
the more sophisticated the decision rule, the more 
precise is (in principle) the targeting, but the greater the 
scope for (often corrupt) discretion by local officials.
6. ?Sustainable agriculture? versus livelihood diversification 
as risk reduction mechanisms
One issue on which contributors? views differed was the 
role in enhancing production and reducing risk and 
vulnerability of ?sustainable agriculture and NR 
management? often linked with low external inputs and 
high levels of indigenous knowledge, versus ?engagement 
with the market?. The latter is associated with livelihood 
diversification and embraces not only in situ forms of 
diversification, but also diversification through permanent 
or seasonal migration, daily commuting, etc. Clearly, the 
which of these is preferable over the other will depend 
largely on local conditions, but in contexts where urban 
sectors are growing more rapidly than rural (as in much of 
Asia) and are generating work for e.g. construction labour, 
where transport links have improved, and where there is 
some prospect of breaking out of traditional restrictions 
(as associated with the caste system) then it is not 
uncommon to note a preference for migration or 
commuting. Evidence from central India suggests that the 
commons accounted for some 25% of the income of 
poorer rural households 3 decades ago, against well 
under 10% now. This may be partly attributable to 
pressure on the commons (degradation, encroachment) 
but is undoubtedly also attributable in part to the improved 
opportunities on offer elsewhere. These changes have 
important implications not only for the management of risk 
and vulnerability, but also more widely for agricultural 
policy where farming is left in the hands of women or the 
elderly. 

7. Area-based differentiation
Several contributors explicitly distinguished between 
those areas well-integrated into market-oriented 
institutions and infrastructure, and those weakly-integrated. 
For the latter areas, several saw the need to strengthen 
community capacity to identify their own requirements, 
address them where possible from their own resources, 
and make demands on government. A central question 
here is how formal institutions (including government) can 
be transformed in order to support empowerment among 
disadvantaged groups. Some saw the role of donors as 
potentially influential here ? in working with government to 
support local capacity to take decisions, strengthen 
ownership and demand accountability, in providing access 
to external technical knowledge and organizational 
knowhow, in minimizing the prospects of elite capture, and 
in supporting the collection, dissemination and discussion 
of data, at both outcome and process levels, on the 
projects and programmes in which they have been 
involved. One contributor highlighted how donor 
engagement had particularly helped in strengthening 
women?s community-based organizations. 
Another contributor, building on the strongly/weakly 
integrated dichotomy, made the general point that 
?territorial? approaches had much to recommend them as a 
means of promoting coherence among interventions, and 
promoting interaction among public and private sectors. 
The pendulum swung against integrated rural 
development projects some years ago on account of their 
high cost, overambitious agendas, and tendency to run in 
parallel with the public sector rather than in ways 
integrated with it. This was further reinforced by purist 
donor views to the effect that ?if it is subsidized, it is 
unacceptable?. However, views such as this do not reflect 
domestic practice in many donor counties, where 
investment incentives are widely used as a means of 
attracting commercial companies into more remote areas. 
There are therefore few grounds for imposing them on 
developing countries.
8. Roles for DFID
A number of roles for DFID have been identified in the 
discussions and in moderator?s summaries. These are at 
times explicit and at times more implicit. They include:

i.  Efforts to stabilise short/medium-term commodity price 
fluctuations in international markets

ii.  Efforts to mainstream risk and vulnerability 
considerations into national policymaking at 
macroeconomic and sectoral levels, and to have social 
protection planning specifically take into account potential 
impacts on production.

iii.  The development and promotion of innovative models 
for personal, crop and asset insurance

iv.  The development of transfer schemes (in cash or kind) 
that impact on the productive economy either directly or 
(through those unable to engage fully in the productive 
economy) indirectly

v.  Efforts to support more scientific assessment of risks 
based in natural phenomena (especially weather events)

vi.  Support for rights-based approaches in respect of 
access to and power over resources, entitlements to 
food, and protection from hazard, access to safety nets 
and social protection, and support especially for the more 
vulnerable rights-holders.

vii.  Support for participatory vulnerability analysis, and 
identification of critical interactions with other rights and 
vulnerabilities for example in relation to education, 
HIV/AIDS, and conflict.

viii.  Support for change in attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviours from local to international policy arenas, which 
lead to gender based discrimination and power inequality 
between women and men. 

ix.  Support for capacity building among local community 
organisations to strengthen them in articulating and 
addressing their own needs, and resisting potential elite 
takeover.

x.  Greater emphasis on sustainable agriculture practices 
and on how they can contribute to reducing food poverty, 
improving water retention and the level of the water table, 
reduce soil erosion, and prevent the loss of diversity 
through the use of locally adapted landraces and varieties.

xi.  Collaboration with other large, international donors and 
apply pressure on
public sectors to develop coherent pro-poor policy and 
intervention
strategies, and achieve adequate staffing and operational 
capacity, plus accountability.

xii.  Support to the public sector in reaching the objectives 
of the previous point, including formal and informal training 
for public staff, and the re-engineering of public extension 
services. 
   
xiii.  Funding for and dissemination of serious studies 
revealing the negative impact of the North´s agricultural 
subsidies and trade policy on the rural livelihoods in the 
South.   

xiv.  Finance for learning processes (methods, 
instruments, information) among
development agencies to improve pro-rural poor 
interventions; these
processes can be facilitated by international research 
organizations. 
  
xv.  Support for livelihood diversification, possibly through 
business development services, through links with the 
private commercial sector, and possibly with an emphasis 
on appropriate services for identifying market 
opportunities, and stimulating the formation of small-scale 
farmer business associations.
 
xvi.  Additional support to the Fair Trade movement to 
increase its share in world trade.  

John Farrington
2 June 2004





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